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ESSAY
SOME THOUGHTS ON AUTONOMY AND
EQUALITY IN RELATION TO
ROE V WADE
RUTH BADER GINSBURGt
The 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
sparked a legal and political controversy that continues to this day.
Judge Ginsburg suggests that the Roe opinion would have been more
acceptable f it had not gone beyond a ruling on the extreme statute
involved in the case. She agrees with commentary maintaining that the
Court should have adverted specfcally to sex equality considerations.
Such an approach might have muted the criticism of the Roe decision.
The breadth and detail of the Roe opinion ironically may have stimu-
lated, rather than discouraged, antiabortion measures, particularly with
respect to public funding of abortion.
These remarks contrast two related areas of constitutional adjudication:
gender-based classification and reproductive autonomy. In both areas, the
Burger Court, in contrast to the Warren Court, has been uncommonly active.
The two areas are intimately related in this practical sense: the law's response
to questions subsumed under these headings bears pervasively on the situation
of women in society. Inevitably, the shape of the law on gender-based classifi-
cation and reproductive autonomy indicates and influences the opportunity
women will have to participate as men's full partners in the nation's social,
political, and economic life.'
Doctrine in the two areas, however, has evolved in discrete compart-
ments. The High Court has analyzed classification by gender under an equal
t This Essay was delivered as the William T. Joyner Lecture on Constitutional Law at the
University of North Carolina School of Law on April 6, 1984.
t United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The author acknowledges with appreciation the assistance of her 1983-1984 law clerk,
Michael Klarman, in the composition of this Essay.
1. See Karst, Foreword- Equal Citizenshop Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 53-59 (1977). In composing this presentation, I have been stimulated, particularly, by the
more encompassing and trenchant work of Professor Sylvia Law of New York University Law
School, Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984), and Professor
Wendy Williams of Georgetown University Law Center, W. Williams, Equality Riddle: Preg-
nancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate (Mar. 1984) (unpublished manu-
script); W. Williams, Pregnancy: Special Treatment vs. Equal Treatment (Mar. 7, 1982)
(unpublished manuscript); W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts
and Feminism (1982) (unpublished manuscript). Iowe both of them special appreciation for shar-
ing their draft manuscripts and ideas with me. For the vulnerabilities readers lind in this discus-
sion of tense issues, however, I bear sole responsibility.
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protection/sex discrimination rubric; it has treated reproductive autonomy
under a substantive due process/personal autonomy headline not expressly
linked to discrimination against women. The Court's gender classification de-
cisions overturning state and federal legislation, in the main, have not pro-
voked large controversy; the Court's initial 1973 abortion decision, Roe v.
Wade,2 on the other hand, became and remains a storm center. Roe 1'. Wade
sparked public opposition and academic criticism, 3 in part, I believe, because
the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incom-
plete justification for its action. I will attempt to explain these twin perspec-
tives on Roe later in this Essay.
Preliminarily, I will relate why an invitation to speak at Chapel Hill on
any topic relating to constitutional law led me to think about gender-based
classification coupled with Roe and its aftermath. In 1971, just before the
Supreme Court's turning-point gender-classification decision in Reed v. Reed,
4
and over a year before Roe v. Wade, i visited a neighboring institution to par-
ticipate in a conference on women and the law. I spoke then of the utility of
litigation attacking official line-drawing by sex. My comments focused on the
chance in the 1970s that courts, through constitutional adjudication, would aid
in evening out the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women and
men.5 I did not mention the abortion cases then on the dockets of several
lower courts-I was not at that time or any other time thereafter personally
engaged in reproductive-autonomy litigation. Nonetheless, the most heated
questions I received concerned abortion.
The questions were pressed by black men. The suggestion, not thinly
veiled, was that legislative reform and litigation regarding abortion might
have less to do with individual autonomy or discrimination against women
than with restricting population growth among oppressed minorities.6 The
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name- The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT.
REv. 159.
4. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference for males as estate administrators held uncon-
stitutional).
5. See Ginsburg, Sex and UnequalProtection: Men and Women as Victims, I J. FAM. L. 347
(1971) (presenting text of October 1, 1971 remarks made at the Southern Regional Conference of
the National Conference of Law Women, held at Duke University Law School).
6. Law journal commentary around that time discussed population control measures that
the government might order. See, e.g., Note, LegalAnalysis and Population Control- The Problem
of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1856 (1971). Some commentators explicitly noted links between
the abortion and population explosion issues. See, e.g., Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Popu.
lation Crisis,- Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 On i o Sr. L.J. 647, 652
(1966) ("[T]he subject of abortion is riding the wave of the grand dialogue over the population
explosion and the need for birth control programs."); Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status, and
Prognosis, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 521, 523 (1970) ("IT]hose countries that have sanctioned
abortion on demand have been rewarded with consequent alleviation of dire overpopulation
.... ); see also Survey Finds 50 % Back Liberalization of Abortion Policy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1971, at Al, col. 1 ("General concern over population growth has become so intense ... that half
the public now favors liberalization of restrictions on abortion."). As the text indicates, blacks-
and in particular, black men-also noted the coincidence of rising population with the liberaliza-
tion of abortion laws, and sometimes were strongly suspicious of the implications. See, e.g., City
Blacks Get Most Abortions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1973, at 94, col. 3 (remarking upon "[tiraditional
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strong word "genocide" was uttered more than once. It is a notable irony that,
as constitutional law in this domain has unfolded, women who are not poor
have achieved access to abortion with relative ease; for poor women, however,
a group in which minorities are disproportionately represented, access to abor-
tion is not markedly different from what it was in pre-Roe days.
I will summarize first the Supreme Court's performance in cases challeng-
ing explicit gender-based classification-a development that has encountered
no significant backlash-and then turn to the far more turbulent reproductive
autonomy area.
The Warren Court uncabined the equal protection guarantee in diverse
settings,7 but line drawing by sex was a quarter in which no change occurred
in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1860s until 1971, the record remained un-
broken: the Supreme Court rejected virtually every effort to overturn sex-
based classification by law. Without offense to the Constitution, for example,
women could be kept off juries8 and could be barred from occupations ranging
from lawyer to bartender.9
In the 1970s overt sex-based classification fell prey to the Burger Court's
intervention. Men could not be preferred to women for estate administration
purposes, the Court declared in the pivotal Reed v. Reed'° decision. Married
women in the military could not be denied fringe benefits-family housing
and health care allowances-accorded married men in military service, the
High Court held in Frontiero v. Richardson.'I Social security benefits, welfare
assistance, and workers' compensation secured by a male's employment must
be secured, to the same extent, by a female's employment, the Supreme Court
ruled in a progression of cases: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,12 Califano v. Gold-
farb,13 Caiffano v. Westcott, 14 and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.
15
Girls are entitled to the same parental support as boys, the Supreme Court
stated in Stanton v. Stanton.16 Evidencing its neutrality, the Court declared in
...black male resistance to abortion" and the view of the "militant [black] movement" that
abortion is "genocide").
7. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (discrimination on the basis of out-of-wedlock birth); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (access to ballot); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (apportion-
ment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to court); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (race discrimination).
8. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding state statute requiring that, to serve
on juries, women, but not men, must volunteer affirmatively for service); Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261 (1947) (upholding state's "blue ribbon" jury scheme despite gross disparity between
numbers of women and men selected to serve); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)
(stating in dictum that states may "confine [juror] selection to males").
9. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (bartender) (decision "disapproved" in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976)); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (lawyer).
See generally Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Conslftution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451, 451-57 (1978).
10. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
12. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security).
13. 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (social security).
14. 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (aid to families with dependent children).
15. 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (workers' compensation).
16. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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Craig v. Boren17 that boys must be permitted to buy 3.2 percent beer at the
same age as girls and, in Orr v. Orr,'8 that alimony could not be retained as a
one-way street: a state could compel able men to make payments to women in
need only if it also held women of means accountable for payments to men
unable to fend for themselves. Louisiana's rule, derived from Napoleon's
Civil Code, designating husband head and master of the household, was held
in Kirchberg v. Feenstra'9 to be offensive to the evolving sex equality principle.
However sensible-and noncontroversial-these results, the decisions had
a spectacular aspect. The race cases that trooped before the Warren Court
could be viewed as moving the federal judiciary onto the course set by the
Reconstruction Congress a century earlier in the post-Civil War amendments.
No similar foundation, set deliberately by actors in the political arena, can
account for the Burger Court sex discrimination decisions.20 Perhaps for that
reason, the Court has proceeded cautiously. It has taken no giant step. In its
most recent decision, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,2 t the High
Court recognized the right of men to a nursing school education at an institu-
tion maintained by the state for women only. But it earlier had declined to
condemn a state property tax advantage reserved for widows,2 2 a state statu-
tory rape law penalizing males but not females, 23 and draft registration limited
to males.24 It has formally reserved judgment on the question whether, absent
ratification of an equal rights amendment, sex, like race, should rank as a sus-
pect classification.
25
The Court's gender-based classification precedent impelled acknowledg-
ment of a middle-tier equal protection standard of review, a level of judicial
scrutiny demanding more than minimal rationality but less than a near-perfect
fit between legislative ends and means. This movement away from the empty-
cupboard interpretation of the equal protection principle in relation to sex
equality claims largely trailed and mirrored changing patterns in society-
most conspicuously, the emergence of the two-career family. The Court's de-
cisions provoked no outraged opposition in legislative chambers. On the con-
trary, in a key area in which the Court rejected claims of impermissible sex-
17. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
18. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
19. 450 U.S. 455 (1981). The Louisiana legislation at issue provided specifically that a hus-
band had a unilateral right to dispose ofjointly owned property without his wife's consent. Id at
456.
20. The Court once observed that the 19th amendment gave women the vote but only that.
See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 290 (1947).
21. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
22. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
23. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
24. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
25. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); Frontiero v,
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
For a more detailed review of the Burger Court's sex discrimination rulings, see Ginsburg,
The Burger Court'r Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 132 (V. Blasi ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE BURGER COURT].
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based classification, Congress indicated a different view, one more sensitive to
discrimination against women.
That area, significantly in view of the Court's approach to reproductive
choice, was pregnancy. In 1974 the Court decided an issue pressed by preg-
nant school teachers forced to terminate their employment, or take unpaid
maternity leave, months before the anticipated birth date.26 Policies singling
out pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment discriminated invidiously
on the basis of sex, the teachers argued. The Court bypassed that argument;
instead, the Court rested its decision holding mandatory maternity leaves un-
constitutional on due process/conclusive presumption reasoning.27 Some
weeks later, the Court held that a state-operated disability income protection
plan could exclude normal pregnancy without offense to the equal protection
principle.28 In a statutory setting as well, under Title VII, the Court later
ruled, as it earlier had held in a constitutional context, that women unable to
work due to pregnancy or childbirth could be excluded from disability cover-
age.29 The classifications in these disability cases, according to the Court,
were not gender-based on their face, and were not shown to have any sex-
discriminatory effect. All "nonpregnant persons," women along with men, the
Court pointed out, were treated alike.
30
With respect to Title VII, Congress prospectively overruled the Court in
1978. It amended the statute to state explicitly that classification on the basis
of sex includes classification on the basis of pregnancy.31 That congressional
definition is not controlling in constitutional adjudication, but it might stimu-
late the Court one day to revise its position that regulation governing "preg-
nant persons" is not sex-based.
Roe v. Wade, in contrast to decisions involving explicit male/female clas-
sification, has occasioned searing criticism of the Court, over a decade of dem-
onstrations, a stream of vituperative mail addressed to Justice Blackmun (the
author of the opinion), annual proposals for overruling Roe by constitutional
amendment, 32 and a variety of measures in Congress and state legislatures to
contain or curtail the decision.33 In 1973, when Roe issued, abortion law was
in a state of change across the nation. There was a distinct trend in the states,
26. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
27. Id. at 639-50. The irrebuttable or conclusive presumption mode of analysis has lost favor
with the Court in other contexts. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1975).
28. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
29. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
30. Id. at 135.
31. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976)).
32. See, e.g., Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1319-25 (1975) (discussing proposed amendments).
33. See, e.g., Hyde, The Human Life Bill: Some Issues andAnswers, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv.
1077 (1982) (congressional response); Witherspoon, The New Pro-Lfe Legislation: Patterns and
Recommendations, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 637 (1976) (state response); Note, Implications ofthe Abor-
tion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (1974) (state
response); see also infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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noted by the Court, "toward liberalization of abortion statutes." 34 Several
states had adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code approach
setting out grounds on which abortion could be justified at any stage of preg-
nancy; most significantly, the Code included as a permissible ground preserva-
tion of the woman's physical or mental health.35 Four states-New York,
Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii-permitted physicians to perform first-tri-
mester abortions with virtually no restrictions. This movement in legislative
arenas bore some resemblance to the law revision activity that eventually
swept through the states establishing no-fault divorce as the national pattern.
36
The Texas law at issue in Roe made it a crime to "procure an abortion"
except "by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."
37
It was the most extreme prohibition extant. The Court had in close view two
pathmarking opinions on reproductive autonomy: first, a 1965 precedent,
Griswold v. Connecticut,38 holding inconsistent with personal privacy, some-
how sheltered by due process, a state ban on the use of contraceptives even by
married couples; second, a 1972 decision, Eisenstadt v. Baird,39 extending Gris-
wold to strike down a state prohibition on sales of contraceptives except to
married persons by prescription. The Court had already decided Reed v.
Reed,40 recognizing the arbitrariness in the 1970s of a once traditional gender-
based classification, but it did not further pursue that avenue in Roe.
The decision in Roe appeared to be a stunning victory for the plaintiffs.
The Court declared that a woman, guided by the medical judgment of her
physician, had a "fundamental" 4' right to abort a pregnancy, a right the Court
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140; see also infra note 81.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1980).
36. On the transition from fault to no-fault divorce, see Raphael, Frank & Wilder, Divorce in
America: The Erosion of Faul, 81 DICK. L. REv. 719, 728 (1976-1977) ("For the past three de-
cades there has been a strong trend away from the traditional notion that one spouse must be
guilty of some injury to the other before a divorce may be granted."); Note, Untying the Knot: The
Course and Patterns of Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 649 (1972). Long before no-fault
divorce legislation became the norm in this country, persons with the financial resources to do so
could travel to certain states or outside the country to end their marriages. See, e.g., Friedman &
Percival, Who Suesfor Divorce?From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 68
(1976) (before the sudden burst of no-fault divorce legislation in early 1970s, "divorce on demand
had been available in many states, but at a stiff price"); Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 1972, at A 18, col. 1
("[S]omething is wrong when people who have $400 and a plane ticket can get quickie divorces
and those who don't can't."), quoted in Zuckman, Recent Developments in American Divorce Legis-
lation, 35 JURIST 6, 12 (1975). Similarly, before Roe, women of means could end their pregnancies
by traveling to states or foreign nations with less restrictive abortion laws. See Burt, The Burger
Court and the Famil, THE BURGER COURT, supra note 25, at 92, 107-08 (for practical purposes,
the availability of abortions in some states undermined the more restrictive regimes); Karst, supra
note 1, at 59 ("Even before Roe v. Wade, wealthy women. . . could obtain abortions by travel-
ing."); Abortionfor Whom, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1969, at 12 ("The rich have always been able
to get abortions by going abroad. The poor cannot travel . . ... "). For example, in 1971, the
second year New York's liberalized abortion law was in effect, 60% of the women having abor-
tions in New York were nonresidents. See Light on Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1972, at A 14,
col. 2.
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18 (citing TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191, 1196 (Vernon 1961)).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Earlier, in Skinner v. Oklahoma exrel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942), the Court had referred to an individual's right to procreate as "a basic liberty."
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 155.
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anchored to a concept of personal autonomy derived from the due process
guarantee. The Court then proceeded to define with precision the state regula-
tion of abortion henceforth permissible. The rulings in Roe, and in a compan-
ion case decided the same day, Doe v. Bolton,42 were stunning in this sense:
they called into question the criminal abortion statutes of every state, even
those with the least restrictive provisions.
Roe announced a trimester approach Professor Archibald Cox has de-
scribed as "read[ing] like a set of hospital rules and regulations. 43 During the
first trimester, "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician";44 in the
next, roughly three-month stage, the state may, if it chooses, require other
measures protective of the woman's health.45 During the final months, "the
stage subsequent to viability," the state also may concern itself with an emerg-
ing interest, the "potentiality of human life"; at that stage, the state "may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."
46
Justice O'Connor, ten years after Roe, described the trimester approach as
"son a collision course with itself."47 Advances in medical technology would
continue to move forward the point at which regulation could be justified as
protective of a woman's health, and to move backward the point of viability,
when the state could proscribe abortions unnecessary to preserve the patient's
life or health. The approach, she thought, impelled legislatures to remain au
courant with changing medical practices and called upon courts to examine
legislative judgments, not as jurists applying "neutral principles," but as "sci-
ence review boards."
48
I earlier observed that, in my judgment, Roe ventured too far in the
change it ordered. The sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobili-
zation of a right-to-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and
state legislatures. In place of the trend "toward liberalization of abortion stat-
utes" noted in Roe,49 legislatures adopted measures aimed at minimizing the
impact of the 1973 rulings, including notification and consent requirements, 50
42. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
43. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976).
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 164-65. The Model Penal Code provision, on which several states had patterned
abortion legislation reform, see Special Project, Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 67,
109 & nn.229-31, contained no limitation as to the stage of pregnancy at which an abortion could
be obtained. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (1980).
47. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2507
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id
49. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140; see also infra note 81.
50. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2497-
99 (1983) (parental and court consent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (parental notifica-
tion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (spousal and parental consent).
1985]
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prescriptions for the protection of fetal life, 5' and bans on public expenditures
for poor women's abortions.
52
Professor Paul Freund explained where he thought the Court went astray
in Roe, and I agree with his statement. The Court properly invalidated the
Texas proscription, he indicated, because "[a] law that absolutely made crimi-
nal all kinds and forms of abortion could not stand up; it is not a reasonable
accommodation of interests."'53 If Roe had left off at that point and not
adopted what Professor Freund called a "medical approach," 54 physicians
might have been less pleased with the decision, but the legislative trend might
have continued in the direction in which it was headed in the early 1970s.
"[S]ome of the bitter debate on the issue might have been averted," Professor
Freund believed; "[t]he animus against the Court might at least have been
diverted to the legislative halls." a55 Overall, he thought that the Roe distinc-
tions turning on trimesters and viability of the fetus illustrated a troublesome
tendency of the modem Supreme Court under Chief Justices Burger and War-
ren "to specify by a kind of legislative code the one alternative pattern that
will satisfy the Constitution."
56
I commented at the outset that I believe the Court presented an incom-
plete justification for its action. Academic criticism of Roe, charging the Court
with reading its own values into the due process clause, might have been less
pointed had the Court placed the woman alone, rather than the woman tied to
her physician, at the center of its attention. Professor Karst's commentary is
indicative of the perspective not developed in the High Court's opinion; he
solidly linked abortion prohibitions with discrimination against women.
57
The issue in Roe, he wrote, deeply fouched and concerned "women's position
in society in relation to men."58
It is not a sufficient answer to charge it all to women's anatomy-a natu-
ral, not man-made, phenomenon. Society, not anatomy, "places a greater
stigma on unmarried women who become pregnant than on the men who fa-
ther their children."59 Society expects, but nature does not command, that
"women take the major responsibility. . . for child care"60 and that they will
51. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2521-22 (1983); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81-84 (1976).
52. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) ("Hyde Amendment" to Title XIX of Social
Security Act); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state Medicaid regulations).
53. Freund, Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983) (adapted from
inaugural Harold Leventhal Lecture at Columbia Law School).
54. Id
55. Id; cf. Burt, supra note 36, at 107-09 (arguing that Roe was "unnecessary" because
"majoritarian institutions" were not "unfairly disregard[ing]" interests of "proponents of free
abortion"); infra note 81.
56. Freund, supra note 53, at 1480.
57. Karst, supra note I, at 58; Cf. M. CAPPELLETri & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 614-15 (1979) (observing that Italian Constitutional Court ruling on abortion statutes
also avoided treating the matter as a women's rights issue).
58. Karst, spra note 1, at 58.




stay with their children, bearing nurture and support burdens alone, when fa-
thers deny paternity or otherwise refuse to provide care or financial support
for unwanted offspring.
I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex discrimination
theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would have
been less furious. I appreciate the intense divisions of opinion on the moral
question and recognize that abortion today cannot fairly be described as noth-
ing more than birth control delayed. The conflict, however, is not simply one
between a fetus' interests and a woman's interests, narrowly conceived, nor is
the overriding issue state versus private control of a woman's body for a span
of nine months.61 Also in the balance is a woman's autonomous charge of her
full life's course-as Professor Karst put it, her ability to stand in relation to
man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.
62
On several occasions since Roe the Court has confronted legislative re-
sponses to the decision. With the notable exception of the public funding
cases, the Court typically has applied Roe to overturn or limit efforts to im-
pede access to abortion. I will not survey in the brief compass of this Essay the
Court's series of opinions addressing: regulation of the abortion decisionmak-
ing process; specifications regarding personnel, facilities, and medical proce-
dures; and parental notification and consent requirements in the case of
minors.63 Instead, I will simply highlight the Court's statement last year reaf-
firming Roe's "basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make
the highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 64 In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,65 the Court ac-
knowledged arguments it continues to hear that Roe "erred in interpreting the
Constitution." 66 Nonetheless, the Court declared it would adhere to Roe be-
cause "stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule
of law."
67
I turn, finally, to the plight of the woman who lacks resources to finance
privately implementation of her personal choice to terminate her pregnancy.
The hostile reaction to Roe has trained largely on her.
Some observers speculated that the seven-two judgment in Roe was moti-
vated at least in part by pragmatic considerations-population control con-
cerns, the specter of coat hanger abortions, and concerns about unwanted
children born to impoverished women. I recalled earlier the view that the
61. But cf. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (contending that
even when the parent-child relationship is involved our law generally does not require a person to
submit to a bodily invasion or the imposition of physical pain to save the life of another).
62. Karst, supra note 1, at 57-59.
63. The Court's 1975-1981 decisions are listed in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 n.1 (1983).
64. Id.
65. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
66. Id. at 2487.
67. Id.
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demand for open access to abortions had as its real purpose suppressing mi-
norities.68 In a set of 1977 decisions, however, the Court upheld state denial of
medical expense reimbursement or hospital facilities for abortions sought by
indigent women.69 Moreover, in a 1980 decision, Harris v. McRae,70 the
Court found no constitutional infirmity in the Hyde Amendment, which ex-
cluded even medically necessary abortions from Medicaid coverage. 71 After
these decisions, the Court was accused of sensitivity only to the Justices' own
social milieu--"of creating a middle-class right to abortion." 72
The argument for constitutionally mandated public assistance to effectu-
ate the poor woman's choice ran along these lines. Accepting that our Consti-
tution's Bill of Rights places restraints, not affirmative obligations, on
government,73 counsel for the impoverished women stressed that childbirth
was publicly subsidized. As long as the government paid for childbirth, the
argument proceeded, public funding could not be denied for abortion, often a
safer and always a far less expensive course, short and long run. By paying for
childbirth but not abortion, the complainants maintained, government in-
creased spending and intruded upon or steered a choice Roe had ranked as a
woman's "fundamental" right.7 4
The Court responded that, like other individual rights secured by the
Constitution, the right to abortion is indeed a negative right. Government
could not intervene by blocking a woman's utilization of her own resources to
effectuate her decision. It could not " 'impose its will by force of law.' ",75 But
Roe did not demand government neutrality, the Court reasoned; it left room
for substantive government control to this extent: Action "deemed in the pub-
lic interest ' 76 -in this instance, protection of the potential life of the fetus-
could be promoted by encouraging childbirth in preference to abortion.77
Financial need alone, under the Court's jurisprudence, does not identify a
class of persons whose complaints of disadvantageous treatment attract close
scrutiny.78 Generally, constitutional claims to government benefits on behalf
68. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
69. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (equal protection clause does not re-
quire public hospitals to perform abortions simply because they provide publicly financed hospital
services for childbirth); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (equal protection clause does not re-
quire state participating in Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to nontherapeutic abor-
tions for indigent women simply because it pays expenses incident to childbirth); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977) (same ruling under Social Security Act).
70. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
71. Id at 326-27. But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 475 A.2d 873 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1984) (state denial of Medical Assistance funds to indigent women seeking medically necessary
abortions violates equal protection clause of, and equal rights amendment to, state constitution).
72. Shapiro, Fathers andSons: The Court, The Commentators, and the Searchfor Values, THE
BURGER CoURT, supra note 25, at 218, 229; see Karst, supra note 1, at 59.
73. See Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1582 (1981); Henkin, Rights:
American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (1979).
74. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 315 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977)).
76. Id.
77. Id
78. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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of the poor have prevailed only when tied to another bark-a right to travel
interstate, discrimination because of out-of-wedlock birth, or gender-based
discrimination. 79 If the Court had acknowledged a woman's equality aspect,
not simply a patient-physician autonomy constitutional dimension to the abor-
tion issue, a majority perhaps might have seen the public assistance cases as
instances in which, borrowing a phrase from Justice Stevens, the sovereign had
violated its "duty to govern impartially." 80
I have tried to discuss some features of constitutional adjudication con-
cerning sex equality, in relation to the autonomy and equal-regard values in-
volved in cases on abortion. I have done so tentatively and with trepidation.
Roe v. Wade is a decision I approached gingerly in prior comment; until now I
have limited my remarks to a brief description of what others have said.
While I claim no original contribution, I have endeavored here to state my
own reflections and concerns.
Roe, I believe, would have been more acceptable as a judicial decision if it
had not gone beyond a ruling on the extreme statute before the Court. The
political process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advo-
cates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening
and acting.81 Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and
79. See Bennett, The Burger Court and the Poor, THE BURGER COURT, supra note 25, at 46,
52-53.
80. Harris, 448 U.S. at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Abortion Backers Hopeful ofGains, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1972, at A9, col. 1 ("Pro-
abortion forces believe they are on the verge of major victories that will soon make abortion on
request available throughout much of the country."); Abortion Laws Gaining Favor as New Stat-
tes Spur Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at A13, col. 2 ("Senator Robert W. Packwood,
Republican of Oregon, predicted ... that most states would abolish laws against abortion within
the next 'one to three years.' "). Polls taken prior to the 1970s indicated that substantial majorities
of Americans had opposed liberalization of abortion laws. See Survey Finds 50% Back Liberaliza-
tion of Abortion Policy, supra note 6, at Al, col. 1 (1965-91% oppose liberalized abortion policy;
1968-85%; 1969-79%; 1971-50%); see also Survey Finds Majority, In Shift, Now Favors Liberal-
ized Laws, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1972, at A1, col. 3 (noting same statistics, and adding to them a
1972 poll revealing that 64% of public believe abortion decision should be left to woman and her
doctor).
Testifying to the "superiority of the legislative solution," Second Circuit Judge Henry J.
Friendly described what happened in 1970 when New York reformed its law:
I can speak with feeling because I was to have presided over a three-judge court before
which the constitutionality of the old law was being challenged. Although we had not
yet heard argument, I could perceive not merely how soul wrenching but how politically
disturbing-and I use "politically" in the highest sense-decision either way would be.
If we upheld the old law, we would be disappointing the expectations of many high-
minded citizens, deeply concerned over the human misery it was creating, its discrimina-
tory effects, its consequences for the population explosion, and the hopes of the least
privileged elements in the community. These people would never understand that if we
held the law constitutional, we would not be finding it good. Indeed, some opponents of
reform would have claimed we had done precisely that. If we were to decide the other
way, many adherents of a deeply respected religion would consider we had taken unto
ourselves a role that belonged to their elected representatives and that we had done what
the latter, after full consideration, had refused. If they asked what specific provision of
the Constitution was violated by this law of more than a century's standing, we would
have had to concede that there was none and that we were drawing on what the Supreme
Court has euphemistically termed "penumbras" to construct a new "fundamental" right.
How much better that the issue was settled by the legislature! I do not mean that every-
one is happy; presumably those who opposed the reform have not changed their views.
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appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict.82
The public funding of abortion decisions appear incongruous following
so soon after the intrepid 1973 rulings. The Court did not adequately explain
why the "fundamental" choice principle and trimester approach embraced in
Roe did not bar the sovereign, at least at the previability stage of pregnancy,
from taking sides.
83
Overall, the Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion's
concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a
constitutionally based sex-equality perspective. I understand the view that for
political reasons the reproductive autonomy controversy should be isolated
from the general debate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for
women and men. I expect, however, that organized and determined opposing
efforts to inform and persuade the public on the abortion issue will continue
through the 1980s. In that process there will be opportunities for elaborating
in public forums the equal-regard conception of women's claims to reproduc-
tive choice uncoerced and unsteered by government.
But the result is acceptable in the sense that it was reached by the democratic process and
thus will be accepted, even though many will not regard it as right.
H. Friendly, Some Equal Protection Problems of the 1970's 14-15 (NYU School of Law 1970)
(available at North Carolina Law Review office).
82. See Burt, supra note 36, at 107-09; cf. Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court,
THE BURGER COURT, supra note 25, at 198, 212. (Roe was "[g]rounded not on principle," but on
an "ad hoc comparison of. . .interests"). One pair of commentators observed:
In many respects the abortion controversy of the 1970s is similar to the busing dis-
putes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Both the pro-life and anti-busing movements
began in reaction to decisions of the Supreme Court. Both activated many people who
previously had been at the periphery of. . .politics. The two movements each caught
on quickly and developed a strong national base.
Uslaner & Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Policies in the Nation and States:
Changes and Stability After the Roe andDoe Decisions, 77 M icH. L. REV. 1772, 1787-88 (1979); see
also id at 1785.
83. Cf. Bennett, supra note 79, at 52 (arguing that Harris (upholding denial of Medicaid
funds for abortion) is inconsistent with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (declaring
inconsistent with equal protection denial of welfare benefits to new residents)).
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